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I. INFORMATION
Modem economists universally acknowledge that information is an
essential component of productivity. Moreover, as they begin to focus
more and more on the nature of information, their conception of infor-
mation widens considerably.
According to a widely cited estimate of Marc Ui Porat,' in 1967
(almost three decades ago), 25.1 per cent of the U.S. Gross National
Product originated with the production, processing, and distribution of
information goods and services sold on the market.2 In addition, the
purely informational requirements of planning, coordinating, and man-
aging the rest of the economy consumed another 21.1 per cent? In other
words, workers whose tasks were predominately informational ac-
counted for almost one-half of the total U.S. labor income at the time.4
Since then, the information economy certainly has grown by leaps and
bounds.
The reaction of the American Express Corporation in 1982, when it
was first included in the Dow Jones Industrial Index, symbolized this
trend toward an increasing role for information. The company issued a
statement that read, "[O]ur product is information .... [Information
that charges airline tickets, hotel rooms, dining out, the newest fashions
and even figures mailing costs for a travel magazine; information that
t Originally submitted as a position paper for an online panel discussion.
* Michael Perelman is a professor of economics at California State University. He
holds a B.A. from the University of Michigan, an M.A. in economics from San Francisco
State College, and a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley.
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grows money funds, buys and sells equities and manages mergers; in-
formation that pays life insurance annuities. . .. "'
Not surprisingly, many have come to see the main tendency of
modem capitalist economies as an evolution toward information
economies. Yet, we should be careful in letting ourselves be carried
away by our enthusiasm for the role of information. To begin with,
some researchers find Porat's estimate a bit excessive. The bulk of the
estimates for the size of the information sector in the advanced capitalist
countries runs from around 25 per cent to 40 per cent of the total econ-
omy.
6
In addition, some of the apparent growth of the information sector is
an illusion that is due to changes in the structure of the economy. Virtu-
ally all work involves the processing of information, but we only tend to
take notice of the informational aspects of work when it becomes a spe-
cialized occupation.
In effect, much of the new information economy merely represents
an increasing specialization in which the abstract content of information
processing becomes a measurable activity separated from the work as-
sociated with it. Jagdish Bhagwati has made much of this specialization
in his analysis of services. He writes of the "continuous process during
which services splinter off from goods and goods, in turn, splinter off
from services."8
For example, today, instead of employing a carpenter to build a
house, we first employ an architect to design it. Architects are part of
the information sector, but carpenters have never been treated that way,
even when they routinely perform design work in the course of building
houses.
Ernesto Galarza offered some insight into the informational proc-
essing associated with agricultural field work, a class of labor thought to
be among the most unskilled known to modem society:
Field labor was a blur in which the details of field harvesting and
the skills it required went unrecognized. To pick a ripe honeydew re-
quires a trained eye for the bloom of tinted cream, a sensitive touch for
the waxy feeling of the rind, and a discriminating nose for the faint
5. Dan Schiller, How to Think About Information, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IN-
FORMATION 27, 27 (Vincent Mosco et al. eds., The University of Wisconsin Press 1988)
(quoting advertisement by American Express).
6. Meheroo Jussawalla, Information Economies and the Development of Pacific
Countries, in THE COST OF THINKING: INFORMATION ECONOMIES OF TEN PACIFIC COUNTRIES
15, 23-24 (Meheroo Jussawalla et al. eds., Ablex 1988).
7. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Splintering and Disembodiment of Services and Developing
Nations, 7 WORLD ECON. 133, 134 (1984).
8. Id.
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aroma of ripeness. In the asparagus fields, the expertness of the Filipino
cutters was obvious to all but those who hired them.9
More important, much of the supposedly vital information is of lit-
tle value. Consider Kenneth Arrow's suggestion that "[t]he meaning of
information is precisely a reduction in uncertainty."' According to this
perspective, some that are normally counted as information producing
activities, say market research, should actually be excluded. Such in-
formation may, at best, charitably be called "local information." It may
reduce uncertainty for the firm that benefits from the information, but it
may create more uncertainty for other agents.
Other so-called informational activities are probably even counter-
productive. For example, Porat's estimate of the information sector
mistakenly includes advertising and marketing activities as information
producing.
Rather than providing information, professionals design much ad-
vertising to do nothing more than delude and confuse people in order to
get an edge on competitors without serving consumers' needs in any
way. True, some advertising is constructive, but surely most is merely
combative, having nothing to do with conveying information." In fact,
we could do better treating such activities as disinformation.
Before we leave the subject of advertising, we must mention that
advertising clutters up our environment. Besides its ever increasing in-
trusiveness and overall unpleasantness, it desensitizes us to our
surroundings. We can also regard at least some of this junk advertising
as disinformation since it obscures valuable clues which might other-
wise give us valuable information about our environment.
Finally, when advertisers exercise their considerable sway in the
media, they degrade our access to information. For example, our maga-
zines are more enthusiastic about printing pictures displaying the
advantages of smoking a particular brand of cigarettes than in discuss-
ing the health effects of cigarettes, lest that information displease their
source of advertising revenue. We should include this cost as part of the
ledger on advertising under the general subheading of disinformation.
9. ERNESTO GALARZA, FARM WORKERS AND AGRi-BusINESS IN CALIFORNIA, 1947-
1960, at 366 (University of Notre Dame Press 1977).
10. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Information, in THE COMPUTER AGE: A
TWENTY-YEAR Vmw 306 (M.L. Dertouzos et al. eds., MIT Press 1979).
11. ALFRED MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE: A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNIQUE
AND BusiNEsS ORGANIZATION; OF THEm INFLUENCES ON THE CONDITIONS OF VARIOUS
CLASSES AND NATIONS 304-07 (3d ed., MacMillan 1920).
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II. INFORMATION AGAIN
Return for a moment to our earlier discussion of resources. Econo-
mists say that traditional resources are rivalrous. By that expression,
they mean that the more that we restrict other people's use of resources,
the more that is left for us. If we are going to farm a piece of land, then
we expect to be able to exclude the rest of the world from disrupting our
fields or taking our crops without compensating us.
Education may also be rivalrous in the sense that the capacity of
educational facilities is limited. When a school is full, accepting a new
student requires the displacement of another.
Information is another case altogether. We do not use up informa-
tion in the same way that we use up food or fuels. On the contrary,
excluding others from access to information becomes self-defeating. It
does not increase our information. It only spreads ignorance.
In fact, the more that people partake of the supply of information,
the greater the total stock of information becomes. In short, information
can spawn more and better information. For example, the more a scien-
tist learns about her field, the more she has to share with others. While
scientists might compete with each other for the priority of a finding,
the discovery of one enriches all.
As a result, the fields of research are very different from agricultural
fields. While exclusivity is imperative in the farmer's field, it makes no
sense in science. After all, the more information that I gather, the more
potential information is available to you.
In conclusion, the concept of scarcity is irrelevant to information.
The more we restrict other people's access to information, the less we
can utilize for our own use. More to the point, as our economy becomes
increasingly dependent on information, our traditional system of prop-
erty rights applied to information becomes a fetter on our development.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INFORMATION
We often hear that property rights in information serve a positive
purpose. For example, exclusive patents encourage corporations to in-
vest in developing new technologies.
Undoubtedly, patent rights are a significant incentive for corpora-
tions, but corporations do not engage in science-people do. As a result,
we must reframe the question: How do we organize society so that we
develop and use our technological and scientific resources most effec-
tively?
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According to this criterion, even economic theory, which is severely
biased toward markets, indicates that information should not be treated
as private property. Kenneth Arrow, a Nobel Prize winning economist,
observed that conventional economic theory holds that goods should
sell for their cost of reproduction. 2 In the case of information, even
though the original cost of gathering the information may have been
substantial, the cost of transmitting this information onto others is
minimal. 3
Arrow added that markets for information are inherently flawed be-
cause information is different from other goods. 4 In shopping for
clothing, for example, we can browse through the store. We can even try
clothes on to see how they look. In the case of information, by contrast,
we can possess the product merely by learning about it. Consequently,
the owner strives to keep the information as secret as possible to prevent
us from shopping for information in an informed manner. 5
Arrow's logic is indisputable. Unfortunately, theory and reality are
moving in two different directions. Information, which libraries and
government agencies once distributed freely, is increasingly becoming
privatized. 6 In the telling phrase of Vincent Mosco, we are evolving
from a paper society to what he calls a "pay-per" society (alluding to the
increasingly common practice of selling information). 7
The United States government has acted as a willing accomplice in
this process. For example:
The role of the Federal Depository Library Program in collect-
ing and circulating government publications is being
undermined by the unavailability of those documents. Budget-
ary constraints have prevented it from acquiring the latest
electronic equipment for information delivery .... The gov-
ernment has approved pilot programs in which private
contractors manage the electronic filing, processing and dis-
semination of data that businesses and individuals are required
12. Arrow, supra note 10, at 614-16.
13. Arrow, supra note 10, at 614-16.
14. Arrow, supra note 10, at 615.
15. Arrow, supra note 10, at 615.
16. Herbert I. Schiller and Anita R. Schiller, Libraries, Public Access to Information,
and Commerce, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFOPMATION 146, 147-66 (Vincent Mosco
et al. eds. 1988); HERBERT I. SCHILLER, INFORMATION AND THE CRISIS ECONOMY 102-03
(1984).
17. Vincent Mosco, Introduction: Information in the Pay-per Society, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INFORAATION 3, 3-26 (Vincent Mosco et al. eds. 1988).
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to submit to government agencies .... In sum, the national in-
formation supply is an endangered resource."
To make matters worse, the government, after paying for the fixed
costs of gathering information, often permits private agents to treat this
information as private property. 9
Finally, the government is continually expanding its concept of so-
called intellectual property rights. Presently, the United States Patent
Office is granting patents on genetic material and even mathematical
procedures that are developed at or in conjunction with universities that
receive substantial public funds. In the process, it is contaminating the
scientific process. Researchers, who once worked with great diligence to
win recognition for their peers, now shroud their research in secrecy in
the hopes of striking it rich.
IV. PATENTS IN COMPUTER SOFrWARE
The computer software industries illustrate wonderfully how treat-
ing information as private property causes unbelievable waste. Today,
software companies are taking pains to undermine each others' effi-
ciency through complex strategies of copyright and patent litigation. As
a result, the legal costs of producing software are soaring. The Wall
Street Journal reported on the case of Paul Emmerich, President of
CadTrak Corporation, a six-person company in San Mateo, California."
This company takes in almost $5 million a year in licensing fees for a
method he invented for moving a cursor around on a graphics screen.
2'
"Mr. Emmerich scans computer ads and treks through trade shows,
hunting for unwitting violators. After four days at the giant Comdex
show in Las Vegas last fall, he says, he 'picked up 10 or 12 new infring-
ers that he could sue.' "2
The firms that CadTrak sues do not knowingly copy CadTrak's dis-
covery. They come upon it independently. Still, one might try to stretch
the usual case for patents by arguing that patents somehow have encour-
aged people, such as Mr. Emmerich, to innovate. This defense does not
hold water in the case of Berkeley Limited Partnership, which settled a
suit with IBM in February 1989 after accusing IBM of patent infringe-
18. Schiller, INFORMATION AND THE CRISIS ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 84.
19. Schiller, INFORMATION AND THE CRISIS ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 84.
20. William M. Bulkeley, Will Software Patents Cramp Creativity?: Growing Threat of
Litigation Worries Firms, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1989, at B1.
21. Id.
22. Id
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ment.' As its name might suggest, Berkeley Limited Partnership has its
roots in the world of finance rather than software. This firm began with
the purchase of a patent at a bankruptcy sale by a Washington, D.C.
lawyer. Berkeley claims that its patent covers some basic software op-
erations that are found in almost every personal computer and word
processing program. 4
The use of the courts to extract rents can cripple the production of
innovative software. Jeffrey Tarter, editor of SoftLetter (a Cambridge,
Massachusetts newsletter) said that such lawsuits can overwhelm a
small software developer "if it's a matter of challenging seven or eight
patents every time you do software and fighting with lawyers."'
Software companies contend that most of the glaring deficiencies of
the software industry are inevitable, claiming that, without the lure of
profit made possible by protecting the vendors' intellectual property, the
programs would never be written in the first place. Others that are fa-
miliar with the software industry insist that the corporate culture is
incompatible with the sort of creativity that good programming requires.
In fact, the majority of the major software houses either began as or
became software brokers rather than software creators. For example,
even Microsoft began as a tiny company which supplied a growing core
of computer hobbyists with the BASIC language. 6 Its fortunes soared
when it won a contract to supply IBM with the DOS operating system;
however, Microsoft did not originate DOS. Instead, it purchased the
software from-Seattle Computer, an even tinier software house, for a
mere $50,000 in 1980.27 Within five years, Microsoft's revenues for
system software reached $75 million.2 Seattle Computer won some re-
lief later when it successfully sued Microsoft and was awarded
$925,000,29 but this amount is a pittance compared to Microsoft's now
legendary fortunes.
The fortunes of Micropro illustrate the conflict between the corpo-
rate culture and successful programming. Micropro was an early
software success story. It marketed Wordstar, the dominant word proc-




26. Peggy Watt, Microsoft Keeps MS-DOS Rights, CONIPUTERWORLD, Dec. 22, 1986, at
58; Peggy Watt, MS-DOS Creator Tim Patterson Earns Place in Industry Annals, Coat-




30. John B. Judis, Technotrends, IN THESE T iEs (Chicago), Sept. 3-9, 1986, at 16-17.
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Rob Barnaby, a programmer, claims that he wrote most of the
code for Wordstar while working for another company, IMSAI.3
Barnaby's program was a masterful tour de force, packing a full
blown word processor into a tiny 64k CP/M machine. According to
John Judis, "when Barnaby, repelled by Micropro International's corpo-
rate culture, quit, the firm's team of programmers were unable to master
and improve Bamaby's code. 32 With the emergence of the IBM, Mi-
cropro merely ported Wordstar over from the 8 bit CP/M world rather
than rewriting it to take advantage of the more powerful 16 bit environ-
ment. Today, Wordstar is all but forgotten.3
V. COMPUTER SOFTWARE AS A PUBLIC GOOD
Micropro did not owe its once comfortable fortunes only to the ex-
pertise of a single programmer. Once it became the standard word
processor, it benefited handsomely from a wide community of users
who made significant contributions to its product.
Wordstar had what were called patches, openings into the program
which allowed users to write their own code to perform specialized
tasks. Many of these patches were eventually incorporated into the pro-
gram itself. More modem programs allow users to write macros (mini-
programs) to make the product more effective, but macros tap only a
limited part of the program's potential.
Ideally, software developers would provide access to the original
code that makes up the program, allowing users more opportunity to
improve the program. Of course, software developers want to maintain
as much secrecy as possible to protect their profits.
Software vendors impose other costs on the economy in order to
protect the value of their commodity. For example, they routinely hide
their code so that potential competitors cannot take advantage of their
programs. This tactic may help purveyors of software collect rents, but
it cripples the potential usefulness of some programs.
The software industry restricts the potential usefulness of its prod-
ucts in an even more blatant respect. Economists understand that a
monopolist will profit by distorting the array of quality and variety of
their product even though such behavior reduces social welfare relative




34. See David Besanko et al., Monopoly and Quality Distortion: Effects and Remedies,
102 Q. J. ECON. 743 (1987); Eric Maskin & John Riley, Monopoly with Incomplete Informa-
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no exceptions. In order to create an artificial range of quality, they actu-
ally spend money to disable some features of their product.
Similar behavior among computer hardware manufacturers is rarer,
although IBM did go to the expense of installing special circuitry to
make their infamous PC-Junior unable to match the performance of its
PC line.35 Earlier, the developers of the original PC line chose the 8088
chip rather than the more powerful 8086 because the corporate head-
quarters would never allow the computer to be built with the 8086-a
possible threat to the existing IBM line of computers.36
Admittedly, software is expensive to develop. The development
costs of a business application program for a microcomputer run at
about the same as many commercial phonograph recordings. Software
prices generally exceed the prices of phonograph records by a signifi-
cant amount, sometimes by thousands of dollars. Once produced,
however, software code costs virtually nothing to duplicate.
Software companies sometimes justify their high prices by the al-
leged costs imposed by piracy, although high prices make piracy a more
tempting alternative to the outright purchase of programs. Although the
software sellers regard pirates as mere criminals, software pirates also
provide valuable services to the industry.
To begin with, pirates perform a great service for the developers by
introducing the program to a wider audience. Currently, many software
companies willingly incur significant costs to send sample disks gratis
to acquaint potential customers with their products. Many alleged pi-
rates save firms such expenses by "sampling" programs to see if they
are worth purchasing later. The vast majority of these supposedly
"stolen" copies remain unused after the pirate spends a couple of hours
trying them out.
One can even go beyond Arrow's suggestion that informational
goods be free to suggesting that piracy of computer software is such a
productive activity that subsidizing pirates might even be justified.
Certainly, piracy can improve software performance. For example,
many of the users who contributed patches to Wordstar were pirates. In
many cases, their contributed patches added more to the value of the
company than the payment for the product would have brought. In this
sense, piracy can significantly add to the value of a program for the
customers who legally purchase it.
tion, 15 RAND J. EcON. 171 (1984); Lawrence J. White, Market Structure and Product Va-
rieties, 67 Am. ECON. REv. 179 (1977).
35. JA1ms CHPosKy & TED LEONSiS, BLUE MAGIC: THE PEOPLE, POWER, AND POLITICS
BEHIND THE IBM PERSONAL COMPUTER 23-24 (1988).
36. Id.
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A decade or so ago, many software houses took great pains to
thwart pirates through copy protection, creating an artificial cost of
transmitting information. The intent was to make software more unlike
public goods. Ironically, copy protection made the program even more
expensive because of the extra programming involved in copy protec-
tion.
To make matters worse, copy protection usually involved major in-
conveniences for purchasers of the program. A groundswell of
consumer resistance built up. Once consumers balked at purchasing
programs with copy protection, this method of ensuring that software
companies could collect rents fell into disuse.
